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1. Introduction
Hannah Arendt and Hans Jonas remained friends from their stu-
dent years in Germany under the spell of Heidegger, through their
decade as sometimes team-teaching colleagues at The New School,
until her death in 1975. But there’s scant public record of their reac-
tions to each other’s work. It’s tempting to suppose that this is because
they have incommensurable philosophical interests. Arendt often
denies she’s a philosopher, preferring the term “political thinker.” Her
focus on the human condition, and more specifically politics, follows
from her attempt to understand totalitarianism. Jonas makes no bones
about being a philosopher. He takes living nature, and ultimately being
as such, as his object of concern, which draws him toward bioethical
issues, given the threats posed to the life-world and human nature by
recent technology. 
At a general level Arendt and Jonas share the view that modernity
opens up a crisis for thought, owing to unprecedented powers that
make it difficult for us to establish limits when everything seems possi-
ble. Given that they explore different aspects of the evil that can come
from our novel powers of action, maybe we should regard their analyses
as a division of labor: Arendt deals with political evil, Jonas with tech-
nological evil. Perhaps, even, Jonas helps us put Arendt’s political
thought in a wider cosmological and theological frame. 
Such a happy synthesis, however, would smooth over how the funda-
mental premises of their thought put them at loggerheads. Richard
Wolin’s recent treatment of Arendt and Jonas as two of “Heidegger’s
children” places them side by side, next to Karl Löwith and Herbert
Marcuse, but doesn’t imagine a dialogue between them.1 Because
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Arendt and Jonas are treated as “two of a kind,” there’s little hint of
the philosophical tension in their relationship and in their different cri-
tiques of Heidegger. But the prospects for such a dialogue look grim
given Christian Wiese’s verdict in his 2007 intellectual biography of
Jonas. Because our understanding of their relationship “is almost com-
pletely shaped by Jonas’ perspective,” Wiese concludes, speculations
about how Arendt would have assessed his philosophy are “certainly
inappropriate.”2 I shall argue that there are in fact glimmerings of
Arendt’s assessment in the published record, and they’re consistent
with what we might expect her to say, based on the rest of her writings. 
A transcript of an exchange between Arendt and Jonas at a 1972
conference in Toronto honoring Arendt’s work provides an indispens-
able clue,3 for it suggests how each would critique the other’s still-ger-
minating last testament: Arendt’s The Life of the Mind and Jonas’ The
Imperative of Responsibility. Subsequently, Arendt makes brief men-
tion of Jonas in The Life of the Mind, and Jonas hints at an appraisal of
her work in a 1977 retrospective in the journal Social Research.4 I shall
draw on these “glimmerings” to make my case that we can appropri-
ately imagine a full-fledged dialogue between them.
This is more than just a chapter in intellectual history, for what’s at
stake in their philosophically charged friendship is the plight of poor,
old metaphysics in our time. The debate will turn on whether Arendt’s
agreement with Heidegger that we stand at “the end of metaphysics”
successfully discredits Jonas’ unabashedly metaphysical project: his
ontological grounding of an imperative of responsibility for the future of
humanity. As philosophers, we must ask, does Arendt’s claim that we
today must think “without banisters” prove that Jonas’ metaphysical
approach is impossible—or, even if possible, implausible—and, at any
rate, unnecessary to answer the problem of nihilism, a problem that
both Arendt and Jonas aim to address? 
2. Arendt on “Thinking without Banisters” after “The End of
Metaphysics”
First we turn to Arendt, whose attempt “to dismantle metaphysics”
must be seen against the background of Kant’s critical project. Kant
famously purports “deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.”5
He relies on a basic distinction between the intellect (Verstand), ori-
ented to the phenomenal world, and reason (Vernunft), which is pro-
pelled by a need to go beyond the bounds of empirical evidence. Though
metaphysics can never become a science, Kant entitles us to appeal to
“ideas of reason”—God, freedom and immortality—in order to make
sense of our lives as practical, moral agents. We may act as if these
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ideas refer to things-in-themselves in the noumenal or supersensible
world. Kant’s two-world theory is a “moral theodicy” because, although
our freedom leaves the moral destiny of this world uncertain and we
should not act dutifully for the sake of rewards, faith in God and the
immortality of the soul promise that virtue and happiness coincide in
the big picture. 
The brunt of Kant’s project is to raise the question, as Susan
Neiman puts it, “Where everything that can be known has been proven,
what becomes of all the rest”— that is, what becomes of the matters
that invite us to think about the meaning of things as a whole?6 On
Arendt’s view, Kant should have said he had shown the limits of knowl-
edge not to make room for faith, but rather to open up a space for
“thinking”: an activity animated by “the urge for meaning.” The basic
fallacy “taking precedence over all specific metaphysical fallacies,”
according to Arendt, “is to interpret meaning on the model of truth,” for
thinking “leaves nothing so tangible behind, and the need to think can
therefore never be stilled by the insights of ‘wise men’.”7 And so her
final verdict on Kant:
Although he insisted on the inability of reason to arrive at knowl-
edge, especially with respect to God, Freedom and Immortality—to
him the highest objects of thought—he could not part altogether
with the conviction that the final aim of thinking, as of knowledge,
is truth and cognition. . . . He never became fully aware of having
liberated reason and thinking, of having justified this faculty and
its activity even though they could not boast of any “positive”
results.8
Thinking, according to Arendt, is primarily negative; it destroys unex-
amined opinions and dissolves established criteria. Withdrawn from
the world, like Penelope spinning her web, the process undoes each
night what seemed conclusive the day before. 
But this leaves Arendt with a dilemma. For she seems to hope for
results from thinking when she explains how she became preoccupied
with the vita contemplativa in the first place. After her notorious book,
Eichmann in Jerusalem, in which she traces the evil of the Nazi
bureaucrat to his “banality” or “thoughtlessness,” she’s haunted by the
question, if not-thinking can be the root of such evil, might thinking be
an antidote to it? But, she worries, how can thinking help people resist
evil if the perpetual quest for “meaning” yields “no positive results or
specific content”?9 
Metaphysics once reassured us that reason could provide “banisters”
in “God or Being or the First Principles and Causes (archai) [Greek]
or the Ideas”: a suprasensory foundation “[that] is more real, truthful
and meaningful than what appears.”10 Arendt concedes that it is under-
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standable for defenders of metaphysics to warn of the specter of
nihilism, for once the supersensible realm is discarded, “the whole
frame of reference in which our thinking was accustomed to orient
itself breaks down” and “nothing seems to make sense any more.”
Although questions of “meaning” aren’t “meaningless,” as positivists
would insist, “the way [these questions] were framed and answered
[throughout the history of two-world metaphysics] has,” Arendt tells
us, following Nietzsche and Heidegger, “lost plausibility.”11
Furthermore, “nihilism” is “a danger inherent in the thinking activity
itself,” for, as Arendt witnessed firsthand in Germany, the relentlessly
dissolving quest for meaning “can at any moment turn against itself,
produce a reversal of the old values, and declare these contraries to be
‘new values’.”12
Just when Arendt seems to have brought our western philosophical
tradition to the brink of shipwreck, she returns to its origin in Socrates
in order to argue that the activity of thinking is of such a nature as to
condition us against evil—not because it produces stable results or
fixed rules, but because of two effects it has on the thinker. First, it
yields conscience as “a moral side-effect.”13 I appear to others as one,
Arendt notes, but for myself I am a “two-in-one” if I engage in a dia-
logue with myself. And thinking, moved by a desire for integrity or har-
mony with oneself, requires that the “two-in-one” be friends. It’s better
to suffer wrong than to do wrong, Arendt claims, because you can’t
befriend and live together with an evildoer, though you can remain
friends with a victim. Arendt concludes that conscience is a “byproduct”
of thinking. Those who (like Socrates) fear self-contradiction or who
(like Kant) fear self-contempt are capable of resisting socially sanc-
tioned evil, Arendt asserts, “neither because they possess a better set of
values nor because old standards were firmly implanted in their minds
and hearts, but because, disposed to think about what they are doing,
they find themselves unable to live with themselves as murderers.”14
The second side-effect of thinking is that it liberates the political fac-
ulty of “judgment”: an “enlarged mentality” by which one imagines the
world from the plurality of others’ perspectives and develops an opin-
ion—meant to be persuasive not coercive—about what’s right or wrong,
beautiful or ugly. Judging brings thinking out of hiding, “always con-
cerns particulars and what is close at hand,” and “makes thinking man-
ifest in the world of appearances, where I am never alone and always
too busy to be able to think.”15
The practical implication of Arendt’s view is that the Eichmanns of
the world are guilty of negligence for their failure to think, for thinking
is not the special province of intellectuals, much less professional
philosophers. 
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Thinking in its noncognitive, nonspecialized sense as a natural
need of human life, the actualization of the difference given in con-
sciousness, is not a prerogative of the few but an ever-present fac-
ulty of everybody; by the same token, the inability to think is not
the “prerogative” of those many who lack brain-power, but the ever-
present possibility for everybody—to shun that intercourse with
oneself whose possibility and importance Socrates first discovered.16
Arendt claims that the standard excuse—“I was just a cog in the
machine”—fails to pass muster because it makes no sense in the court-
room where “a person is on trial, not a system or an ‘ism’.” The relevant
question to a defendant like Eichmann is, “Why did you let yourself
become and continue to be a cog, a nobody?”—which means, “Why
didn’t you stop and think and seek to become a person with integrity?”17
Even after the end of theodicy, a longing for “poetic justice” persists
in the idea that, although evil inflicts “useless suffering,” the wicked at
least get their comeuppance because they are saddled with a tormented
psyche. Arendt denies us even this consolation when she claims that
the greatest evils of the twentieth century may well have left the perpe-
trators without a second thought. Yet she, too, seems ultimately reas-
sured by two ideas: (1) that thinking, as “an ever-present faculty of
everybody,” justifies our holding such evildoers responsible for their
negligence; and (2) that the life of the mind, even without recourse to
metaphysical first principles or fixed moral rules, can be counted upon
to generate conscientious resistance to limitless, extreme evil. Even
under the circumstance of “total moral collapse,” where “every legal act
is immoral and every moral act a crime,”18 there remains something
within our nature that we can rely on, namely the call of conscience,
awakened by the activity of “thinking without banisters,” empowering
one, at the very least, to resist the tide of socially sanctioned murder. 
3. The Arendt/Jonas Exchange in Toronto, 1972
The arguments of The Life of the Mind are already “in the air” in
Arendt’s seminars and her seminal 1971 essay, “Thinking and Moral
Considerations.” At a 1972 symposium in Toronto, Jonas sees the writ-
ing on the wall and challenges Arendt’s leading idea that we today
must “think without banisters” and that we don’t need more positive
results or specific content to overcome nihilism.
The symposium takes place at the peak of disenchantment with the
war in Vietnam. Arendt begins by addressing a charge leveled by the
Canadian political theorist Christian Bay: that her indirect link
between theory and practice, or thinking and action, shows a lack of
seriousness about the obligation of political theorists to educate citizens
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to solve urgent problems. Arendt replies that she worries more about
professional philosophers who rush into passionate engagements that
foreclose the process of thinking. It’s enough that in extreme situa-
tions—when most go along with the crowd—the habit of thinking
induces resistance and shows “who’s really willing to stick his neck
out.” But educators who preach to their students—telling them how to
think and what to do—treat them “like they’re in a nursery,”19 Arendt
states, and this is a poor model for persuasion among equals in the
political realm. Ideologues are more concerned about the purity of their
souls than the stability and order of the world they purport to improve. 
At this point Jonas intervenes and asks Arendt: “What does it take
to care for the stability and good order of this world?”20 The core ques-
tion of political philosophy—What is a fitting home for humanity?—can
be decided, Jonas tells us, only if we form some idea of what “man” is or
ought to be: an idea that requires a “truth about man” that can validate
our judgments about what we ought and ought not to do, especially
regarding technological enterprises that are “putting their stamp on
the total dispensation of things.”
As political action was understood until the twentieth century, Jonas
concedes, the condition of the commonwealth didn’t have to be decided
by ultimate standards; we could do with “penultimates.” But, given the
extreme danger that technology poses to the future of humanity, Jonas
claims, we can’t afford to declare metaphysics bankrupt and depend
only on “shareable judgments,” for “we can share judgments to our
perdition with many, but we must make an appeal beyond that
sphere.”21
Arendt’s post-metaphysical thinking, Jonas concludes, is too flimsy
to respond to the crisis that Arendt herself describes in her earlier
work, The Human Condition, under the rubric of “earth-alienation.”22
All she can say is that judgments about the limits of technology are
political, not scientific, and call for fair-minded opinions rendered from
the perspective of “an enlarged mentality.” But this offers no solid basis
for distinguishing between valid and invalid judgments. And, as we fid-
dle, Rome burns. Jonas reminds us that Kant doesn’t simply describe,
as does Arendt, the experience of judging, but finds judging to be guided
by “the concept of the good.” The idea of the supreme good may escape
definition, Jonas admits, but it can’t be entirely empty and it’s related
to our idea of the human essence. Therefore, Jonas concludes, against
Heidegger and Arendt alike, metaphysics must be invoked to give us “a
final directive.”23
Just as Arendt’s remarks in Toronto reveal the line of thinking she
will spell out more fully in The Life of the Mind, so Jonas’ rejoinder
anticipates his emerging metaphysics, which will only come to fruition
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with the 1979 publication of The Imperative of Responsibility.24 But
their main areas of disagreement are already on the table. For Jonas, a
robust response to the ethical challenge posed by technology demands a
metaphysics that includes a truth about man, an idea of the supreme
good, and a final directive. Though Arendt had died by the time Jonas
completed the book that would transform her friend from an ivory
tower “professional thinker” into an internationally renowned public
intellectual, we shall see that her responses to Jonas at the Toronto
symposium tip her hand regarding how she would have reacted to his
most important work. First, however, we need an overview of how
Jonas carries out his task.
4. Jonas’ Ontological Grounding of an Imperative of
Responsibility
The root of modern nihilism, according to Jonas, is mind/matter dual-
ism: “the spiritual denudation of [the concept of nature] at the hands of
physical science”25 since the Copernican revolution. No longer believing
that humanity belongs to a sacred order of creation or “an objective
order of essences in the totality of nature,” moderns have lost not only
the grounds for cosmic piety, but also a stable image of human nature,
even the conviction that we have a nature. In the early 1950s, Jonas
writes:
That nature does not care one way or the other is the true abyss.
That only man cares, in his finitude facing nothing but death, alone
with his contingency and the objective meaninglessness of his pro-
jecting meanings, is a truly unprecedented situation. . . . As the
product of the indifferent, his being, too, must be indifferent. . . .
There is no point in caring for what has no sanction behind it in
any creative intention.26
Existentialism, on Jonas’ diagnosis, is a symptom of “the ethical vac-
uum” caused by two key assumptions of the modern credo: (1) that the
rest of being is alien and indifferent to our existence; and (2) that the
idea of obligation is a human invention, not a discovery based on a
good-in-itself beyond us. Heidegger’s authentic Dasein, at the moment
of decision, stands unguided by any eternal measure: a “freely project-
ing existence” who must create values on the basis of nothing but the
shifting soil of history. “Will replaces vision,” laments Jonas, and the
“temporality of the act ousts the eternity of the “good-in-itself’.”27 Jonas
traces Heidegger’s “leap” into the arms of the Nazis to “the absolute
formalism of his philosophy of decision.”28
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The root of this formalism is dualism’s stark divide between human
beings and the rest of nature: a condition depriving us of the resources
for thinking of nature as a meaningful whole to which we belong and
which commands our responsibility. Hans Jonas’ whole philosophy
aims at explaining, in a manner consistent with modern science, why
human destiny makes a real, objective difference—because living
nature is a good-in-itself and our responsibility for the future of human-
ity is ontologically grounded “neither in the autonomy of the self nor in
the needs of the community, but in an objective assignment by the
nature of things (what theology used to call the ordo creationis).”29
Jonas’ recovery of the meaning of being unfolds in two stages: (1)
existential and (2) ontological.30 In the first stage, elaborated in The
Phenomenon of Life, Jonas uses Heidegger’s own existential categories
to undermine the modern credo that human being is the source of all
value. Jonas provides “an existential interpretation of the biological
facts” that lets us see, in the spirit of Aristotle’s psychology, how all
organisms, not only humans, have “concern for their own being.”31
Value and disvalue are not human creations but are essential to life
itself. Every living thing has a share in life’s “needful freedom” and
“harbors within itself an inner horizon of transcendence,”32 for each
organism must reach out to its environment in order to stay alive. 
Still, not all forms of life are the same. Plants, animals, and the
human animal display an “ascending” development of organic functions
and capabilities. Plants are driven by their metabolic needs and stand
in an immediate relationship to their environment. In animals, the
powers of motility and appetite, feeling and perception are grafted onto
metabolism, allowing animals to have a more distanced relationship to
their surroundings. “The secret of animal life,” writes Jonas, “is the gap
it is able to maintain between immediate concern and mediate satisfac-
tion.”33 Finally, in humans, what Aristotle called the nutritive and sensitive
powers of soul can be guided by the “rational” capacities for imagina-
tion, thinking, and moral responsibility. These capacities enable us to
act from a sense of our place in the world as a whole. But our widened
horizon of self-transcendence brings in its wake perils peculiar to
human existence: moods like anxiety, guilt, and despair. 
Against the mechanistic tendency of modern thought, which boils
the complex down to its simplest parts, Jonas finds the germ of what is
higher in lower forms of evolution. “Reality or nature is one,” insists
Jonas, “and testifies to itself in what it allows to come forth from it.”34
Jonas calls his view “integral monism.” It involves two conjectures that
can’t be proven but are consistent with biological facts, existentially
interpreted: (1) that matter’s feat of organizing itself for life attests to
latent organic tendencies in matter; and (2) that the emergence of the
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human mind does not mark a great divide within nature, but elabo-
rates what is prefigured throughout the life-world.
The extension of psyche or self-concern to all organisms invites the
second, ontological stage of Jonas’ thought, presented in The Imperative
of Responsibility. Jonas worries that a nihilist may acknowledge the
presence of subjective value in nature, yet doubt “whether the whole
toilsome and terrible drama is worth the trouble.” What must be estab-
lished is the objective reality of value—a good-in-itself—because only
from it can we derive a binding duty to guard life: the gift of being. On
the basis of “intuitive certainty,” Jonas derives “the ontological axiom”
that the goodness of life is not relative to already existing purposes, for
“the very capacity to have purposes at all is a good-in-itself.” Through
life, being says “Yes” to itself. Only humans, however, are able to dis-
cern the ontological truth: that the presence of life in being is “abso-
lutely and infinitely” better than its absence.35
The ethical consequence of this axiom is that we have an obligation
to protect the life-world, for we are “executor[s] of a trust which only
[w]e can see, but did not create.”36 But not all organisms have equal
moral standing. Insofar as we are able to understand the whole of
which we are a part, we should see ourselves, to use Hegelian lan-
guage, as “a ‘coming-to-itself’ of original substance.”37 The primary
object of our responsibility is our own vulnerable place at the top of the
“ascending order” of nature. Jonas states:
Since in [man] the principle of purposiveness has reached its high-
est and most dangerous peak through the freedom to set himself
ends and the power to carry them out, he himself becomes the first
object of his duty not to ruin, as he well can do, what nature has
achieved in him by the way of his using it.38
This is no anthropocentric conceit, according to Jonas, but “an objective
assignment by the nature of things”: to ensure the quality of life for
future generations, to “never make the existence or essence of man as a
whole a stake in the hazards of action.”
Has Jonas provided the glimpse of eternity that he claims is neces-
sary to overcome the irrationalist decisionism of Heidegger’s nihilism?
Jonas remains a modern in that he cannot rely on the vertical orienta-
tion of Platonic ontology that found the eternal beyond the transient:
pure being apart from becoming. Today, Jonas reminds us, it must be
becoming rather than abiding nature that holds out the promise of a
reunion between ontology and ethics. Unlike the permanent and inde-
structible first principle of Platonic ontology, the good-in-itself of living
nature, and especially of thoughtful, imaginative, and responsible life
within it, is at the mercy of our actions. 
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Three decades ago Jonas admonished us:
The warning lights of various limits are coming on. The time for
the headlong race of progress is over, not of course for guarded
progress itself. . . . [T]he starry-eyed ethics of perfectibility has to
give way to the sterner one of responsibility. The latter is not
devoid of hope, but gives also fear its rightful place. Its heart is ven-
eration for the image of man, turning into trembling concern for its
vulnerability. Promethean immodesty . . . must yield to the mod-
esty of goals that we and nature can afford.39
The ethical upshot of Jonas’ precautionary principle is to question the
mantra of economic growth, and expose it as a cover for a culture of
greed and waste; and to challenge the push towards “enhancement” in
biotechnology, and reveal it as expressing contempt for “the integrity of
the human essence.”40
Jonas draws on Heidegger’s method of “existential interpretation”
but extends it to the life-world as a whole. Jonas’ critique of dualism
opens up the possibility of metaphysics that Heidegger had preemp-
tively ruled out.41 Having followed Heidegger down his post-metaphysi-
cal path, Arendt’s “thinking,” Jonas contends, is too flaccid to address
the threat of nihilism and too dismissive of the possibility and necessity
of metaphysics. It fails to leave us with the substantive vision we need
to put limits on the dangerous technologies we possess today. 
5. Arendt’s Implicit Reply to Jonas’ Ontological Project
Arendt’s rejoinder to Jonas at the 1972 Toronto symposium foreshad-
ows how she would have replied to The Imperative of Responsibility had
she lived to see its publication. Recall Jonas’ riposte to Arendt: that “we
can share our judgments to our perdition with many, but we must
make an appeal beyond that sphere” if we’re to meet “the extreme dan-
ger that technology poses to the totality of life on earth.”42 Arendt
replies that if our future should depend on “an ultimate” that will
decide for us “from above,” then we’re lost, for this demands that “a
new god will appear.” Arendt objects to such an appeal, for she asks,
“Who’s going to recognize it?” and “How will we avoid an infinite
regress when we try to establish rules for recognizing it?”43
Arendt identifies Jonas’ hope for “a final directive” with religious
revelation. This she regards as evading the reality we have faced since
the eighteenth century, when the God of medieval Christianity disap-
peared, namely that “in our nakedness, we are confronted with the fact
that men exist in the plural.”44 The totalitarian catastrophe, she con-
cedes, would probably not have happened if people had still believed in
“an ultimate”—like a God who ruled over heaven and hell. But amidst
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the total moral collapse of Nazism and Stalinism, there were no “ulti-
mates” to which people could appeal. Worse yet, those firmly convinced
of “the old values,” Arendt observes, were most ready to exchange them
for a new set, provided they were given one. 
The hard lessons Arendt draws from totalitarianism are that “you’ll
never know how somebody will act,” especially in a crisis, and that so
long as you hand someone a set of values, they’ll be more than willing
to exchange the old verities for new ones, for they are more interested
in the feeling of certainty than in the content of the values. They get
used to leaning on a “banister,” and so of not having to think for them-
selves. There’s no way, Arendt states, of stabilizing the situation we’ve
been in since the discrediting of “ultimates” in the eighteenth century.
This leads her to ask what we can rely on if no “final directive” is given.
And her answer, as we now know, is the thinking process itself and its
“side effects”: conscience and the faculty of judgment. 
Jonas would see Arendt’s response as begging the question, for he
appeals neither to revelation nor to a heteronymous law. He offers
instead a rational, albeit speculative argument, yielding an imperative
received on the basis of reason alone. The heart of the matter, how-
ever, is that Arendt would reject Jonas’ view not for being religious,
but for being too rationalistic: for falling prey to “fallacies” that render
metaphysics implausible today. The best evidence we have for Arendt’s
likely line of attack comes from the one reference she makes to Jonas’
early work in The Life of the Mind. 
On the surface, she applauds her friend’s 1954 essay “The Nobility of
Sight” for being “of unique help in the clarification of the history of
Western thought”: highlighting the advantages of sight compared to
the other senses and explaining why it has served as a guiding
metaphor for the thinking mind. As Jonas puts it, “the mind has gone
wherever vision has pointed.” His key claim is that seeing necessarily
“introduces the beholder,” and for the beholder, in contrast to the audi-
tor, the “present is not the point-experience of the passing now,” but “is
transformed into a dimension with which things can be beheld . . . as a
lasting of the same. . . . Only sight, therefore, provides the sensual
basis on which the mind may conceive the idea of the eternal, that
which never changes and is always present.”45
Having complimented her friend for his trenchant diagnosis of west-
ern metaphysics, Arendt shows how she would have criticized Jonas’
own metaphysics. First, she observes, the mind has not necessarily
gone where vision has pointed. Though vision does inform the classical
idea of thinking as cognition, culminating in reason’s dream of achiev-
ing noetic intuition with “the mind’s eye,” sight is a less appropriate
metaphor for two other faculties of mind: willing and judging. The will
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has traditionally been modeled on either desire or hearing, as in the
Hebraic notion of the pious will obedient to God’s commands. And judg-
ing has, in Kant for example, taken its cue from the sense of taste.
Sight provides a poor model for the faculties of willing and judging. 
Second, and more important, the faculty of thinking is misconstrued
when it’s modeled on sight. According to Arendt, “what recommended
sight to be the guiding metaphor in philosophy—and, along with sight,
intuition as the ideal of truth—was not just the ‘nobility’ of this most
cognitive of our senses, but the very early notion that the philosopher’s
quest for meaning was identical with the scientist’s quest for truth.”46
The senses are essentially cognitive because they are instruments
enabling us to know and deal with the world. They aim at an end out-
side of themselves. But thinking is always “out of order” because, with-
drawn from the world and restlessly seeking meaning, it produces no
“end-results” that will survive its own activity. 
Thinking, Arendt tells us, needs speech not only to become manifest,
but in order to be activated at all. Enacted in sequences of sentences,
thinking can never arrive at stable, certain truths confirmed by self-
evident intuition available to speechless contemplation. “Meaning”—
the target of “thinking,” properly understood—is “slippery” because
“nothing expressed in words can ever attain the immobility of an object
of pure contemplation.” The best sensuous model for thinking, Arendt
suggests, is the amorphous “sensation of being alive.”47
Arendt modifies Heidegger’s account of Denken: turning away from
Plato not to the pre-Socratics but to Socrates himself. This enables her
to find a moral nerve in the thinking process that’s absent in
Heidegger’s mystifying talk of listening to the call of being. Though
Arendt’s rejection of supersensible vision isn’t intended as a criticism of
Jonas—whose The Imperative of Responsibility was still percolating at
the time—it announces the most significant divergence between their
two paths of thought. Arendt would criticise Jonas for trying, like Kant,
to refurbish outdated “banisters” and “final directives” and for, like
Heidegger, giving priority to ontology over politics as a way of placing a
check on technology. By Arendt’s lights, Jonas’ craving for an “ulti-
mate” runs the risk of invoking a “new god” who promises to save us
but threatens to shut down the public realm and short-circuit our need
for “judgment.” If Jonas espies Arendt’s post-metaphysical thinking
through the filter of his worries about our assault on nature, Arendt
would see Jonas’ metaphysics through the lens of her concerns with
totalitarianism. 
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6. Jonas’ Last Stand: Metaphysics and Modesty
Can Jonas answer Arendt’s implicit charge that his metaphysics has
lost plausibility today? In the Toronto exchange he agrees that we can’t
have ultimates as “a command performance” simply because “we need
them so bitterly.” The fact that we need them, however, doesn’t prove
they don’t exist, and, as Jonas puts it in The Imperative of
Responsibility: 
For the search to be unprejudiced, the worldly philosopher strug-
gling for an ethics must first of all hypothetically allow the possibil-
ity of a rational metaphysics, despite Kant’s contrary verdict, if the
rational is not preemptively determined by the standards of posi-
tive science.48
Jonas here denies Arendt’s charge that metaphysics must reduce think-
ing’s quest for meaning to cognition’s quest for truth. Thinking aims at
a different kind of truth than cognition, he proposes, and his ontological
grounding of an imperative of responsibility aspires to truth, not mere
Arendtian “meaning.”
After boldly affirming the possibility of metaphysics, he seems to
contradict himself, agreeing with his friend that we are not in posses-
sion of ultimates by knowledge or faith. Knowledge of ignorance is the
better part of wisdom, he says, and should make us hesitate to launch
into actions with far-reaching consequences in the public sphere. Our
technological enterprises in particular have an eschatological tendency:
a built-in utopianism. Even lacking knowledge of ultimate values, or of
what “man” is such that the world can be a “fitting” habitat, Jonas
insists, we should at least abstain from letting “eschatological situa-
tions” come about. Modesty in the face of our ignorance commands cau-
tion, even in the absence of comprehensive wisdom about “the good for
man.” With this, Arendt agrees.49
Jonas’ appeal to restraint based on “learned ignorance” is not incon-
sistent, I contend, with his metaphysical grounding of a final directive,
for his precautionary imperative doesn’t provide a full-fledged vision of
“the good life for man.” Rather, its force is negative: “Never make the
existence or essence of humanity as a whole a stake in the hazards of
action.” Although Jonas’ thinking does produce a fixed rule, judgments
about how to interpret this imperative in the context of particular
issues are still a matter of casuistry and opinion. These questions
aren’t settled by the simple application of a theoretically generated
standard to a practical case. Jonas’ own bioethical essays, where he
takes stands on issues like experimentation on human subjects, the
brain-death criterion, genetic engineering and cloning, attest to this.
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His judgments are more substantive and directed than Arendt’s “repre-
sentative thinking,” but less “ultimate” than the pronouncements of a
new god.
7. Arendt’s Last Stand: Amor Mundi
Perhaps there is more convergence between Arendt and Jonas than
first meets the eye, for she is no less aware than he of technology as a
threat to life on earth. As she puts it in The Human Condition:
If one wishes to draw a line between the modern age and the world
we have come to live in, he may well find it in the difference
between a science which looks upon nature from a universal stand-
point and thus acquires complete mastery over her, on the one
hand, and a truly “universal” science, on the other, which imports
cosmic processes into nature even at the obvious risk of destroying
her, and, with her, man’s mastership over her.50
Arendt clearly has nuclear catastrophe in mind, but soon she would
have pointed to environmental degradation as well. These spring from
our newfound powers to produce elements never found in nature, to
transform mass into energy and radiation into matter, and to populate
space around the earth with man-made stars, i.e., satellites. And well
before the bioethical phase of Jonas’ writing, she’s prescient in identify-
ing creative novelties that “used to be thought the prerogative of divine
action”:51 both the ability to create (or recreate) the miracle of life in a
test-tube and the dream of extending the human lifespan far beyond its
current 100-year limit. These alterations of natality and mortality
express the wish to exchange the gift of human life for something we
have made ourselves. It’s a political, not a scientific or technical ques-
tion, Arendt states, to decide whether we wish to use our knowledge in
these ways.
For Arendt the “world” is humanly built, but it exists on the earth,
the mother of life, and under the sky, which opens life out into the air
and sheds light and rain on the things of the earth. The earth and sky
give our world its enabling conditions, but don’t grant it a teleological
direction. As for our species, Arendt speaks of “the human condition,”
not “human nature.” She defines who we are in terms of an ensemble of
powers whose flourishing is necessary for a good life. But she rejects
the classical grounding of “what Man is” on the basis of a natural
essence or fixed teleology, for this would deprive us of freedom’s inde-
terminacy. Still, she would affirm, citizens need to be grateful and to
care for the natural environment that enables the existence of political
life. But to Jonas’ claim that the cosmos must once again be the horizon
of political thought, Arendt would reply that recovering the meaning of
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the earth doesn’t require a cosmic teleology, and that such a metaphys-
ically loaded view of nature can’t supply a publicly agreed-upon first
principle anyway.52
8. Convergence: Truth and/or Friendship?
To our surprise, we find our two paths of thought converging. Jonas’
cosmic piety yields an imperative that’s not a visionary blueprint but
an anti-utopian call to modesty. Furthermore, Jonas’ anti-utopianism
comprises the heart of his critique of totalitarian ideologies that would
sacrifice the good for the illusion of the perfect. And Arendt’s amor
mundi is mindful of how the Promethean tendencies of homo faber
threaten to squander the enabling gifts of nature—earth and sky—that
make a habitable world possible. 
Still, we can’t overlook the profound differences of sensibility and
doctrine that divide these two friends. Jonas’ keen awareness of these
differences is evident in his 1977 retrospective of Arendt:
She was intensely feminine and therefore no feminist (“I don’t want
to lose my privileges,” she used to say). She liked to be brought
flowers, to be escorted, to have male attention to the lady. Yet she
considered men on the whole the weaker sex, more removed from
the intuitive grasp of reality, more subject to the deception of the
concept, therefore more prone to illusion and less perceptive of the
ambiguity and admixture of shadows in the human equation—thus
actually to be protected.53
That Arendt saw Jonas as fitting the mold of the male philosopher
may be gleaned from a vignette that Hans’ wife, Lore, recently dis-
closed to me after I had finished a draft of this paper. Late in her life,
Jonas gave Arendt a chapter to read from his work in progress, The
Imperative of Responsibility. As Lore recounts the episode, 
She gave it back to him and said, “Hans, this is the book the Good
Lord meant you to write.” He was very pleased with this comment.
Later, she said to me, “I have objections to certain parts, but I don’t
want to disturb his fine frenzy.” Protecting the male ego as
always.54
And, I would add, the male ego caught up in the frenzy of metaphysics:
in thrall to “the deception of the concept.”
If it is philosophical friendship, beyond doctrinal disagreements, that
links them most of all, this may, ironically enough, be a last point in
favor of Arendt. In her 1958 essay, “On Humanity in Dark Times,” she
writes of Lessing:
A single absolute truth, could there have been one, would have
spelled the end of humanity. . . . Any doctrine that in principle
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barred the possibility of a friendship between two human beings
would have been rejected by his untrammeled and unerring con-
science. . . . He, while polemical to the point of contentiousness, was
concerned solely with humanizing the world by incessant and con-
tinual dialogue about its affairs and the things in it. He wanted to
be the friend of many, but no man’s brother.55
Arendt contrasts Lessing’s embrace of plurality to Kant’s penchant
for the unity of reason:
[T]he inhumanity of Kant’s moral philosophy is undeniable. And
this is so because the categorical imperative is postulated as abso-
lute and in its absoluteness introduces into the interhuman
realm—which by its nature consists of relationships—something
that runs counter to its relativity. The inhumanity which is bound
up with the concept of “one single truth” emerges with particular
clarity in Kant’s work precisely because he attempted to found
truth on practical reason; it is as though he who had so inexorably
pointed out man’s cognitive limits could not bear to think that in
action, too, man cannot behave like a god.56
Arendt anticipates her thesis in The Life of the Mind: that truth is an
inappropriate target for the activity of thinking and has totalitarian
implications when applied to the political realm. And her misgivings
about Kant would only be aggravated in the case of Jonas who (1) goes
beyond the cognitive limits Kant places on metaphysical speculation;
and (2) expands the scope of the Kantian imperative, finding its source
not in practical reason but in Being itself. 
Arendt sides with Lessing against Kant and Jonas. This is more
than a concession to the limits of philosophy, for there’s a philosophical
substructure to her plea on behalf of friendship. Thinking, on her
account, is a ceaseless quest for “meaning” enacted in the soul’s dia-
logue with itself, oriented by its desire for harmony—or friendship—
with itself. But the thinker, I submit, needs other “two-in-ones”—philo-
sophical friends—as a reality check: to test whether she’s making sense
about the world they seem to share in common. She needs to be chal-
lenged by the surprising perspectives of outsiders. Though the fact that
others disagree—so that one finds oneself in disharmony with them—
isn’t a sufficient reason to change one’s mind, friendship with oneself
risks delusion if one disregards the unique angles that thoughtful oth-
ers bring to the table. Thinking needs friendship. And because friend-
ship requires “plurality,” one can’t have true friends upon whom one
wants to impose “one single truth.”
Jonas acknowledges Arendt’s gift for friendship and appreciates how
it transcends their philosophical disputes. In a letter composed in 1974
on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of their friendship, he writes:
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We are not exactly “related natures,” often see things differently,
and react spontaneously in different ways to things. But as to the
question of what matters in the end and always, about that we
have understood each other from the start without having to say so.
There was never any doubt about what was important and what
unimportant. Thus we could, apart from the Eichmann-affair,
debate to our hearts’ content about the debatable with the knowl-
edge that we are “in principle,” or “in actuality,” or however one
wants to call that thing, yet in agreement. And, in addition, there’s
the plain fact—that one, thank God, need not give reasons to
explain—I like you enormously.57
By conceding that philosophical disagreements don’t impugn their
unspoken “agreement” over “what matters in the end and always,”
doesn’t Jonas grant the point of Arendt’s Lessing essay: that the ties
that bind us in philosophical friendship matter more than “truth”?
I don’t think so. What’s most important to both, to be sure, is not
whether they reach the same conclusions, but the other’s seriousness,
dignity and originality of mind: as Jonas puts it in his eulogy at
Arendt’s funeral, a refusal to let “a cheap formula for the human
predicament pass muster.”58 But Arendt goes beyond this, saying
there’s no truth about questions of “meaning” that make us think, and
here’s where she overstates her case. In his 1977 retrospective, Jonas
argues that there’s an inherent flaw in Arendt’s model of thinking as
essentially seeking no end-result. Following the Biblical idea of “casting
your bread upon the waters” (Eccl. 11:1), Jonas claims that thinking is
animated by the hope that one’s “bread” can withstand exposure to “the
waters” because it possesses a truth that justifies its being tasted by
future generations of thinkers. Insofar as Arendt’s own reflections on
the vita activa and vita contemplativa aspire to this ideal, they, too,
attest to the link between the quests for meaning and for truth. 
Still, Arendt might retort, one should make a distinction between
opinions about the human condition and metaphysical propositions
about the supposed supersensible ground of the sensible world: “God or
Being or the First Principles and Causes (archai) [Greek] or the
Ideas.” It’s the latter she finds “implausible” today. But Jonas, too,
rejects two-world dualism. His “integral monism” roots mind—even in
its most abstract manifestation, “thinking”—in the life-world, and he
agrees with Arendt that thinking never lets us escape our embodiment
and mortality.
Even if Arendt isn’t persuaded by Jonas’ ontological argument (not
to mention his theological arguments), she’s committed to more than
she admits to. It would be dogmatic for Arendt to rule out a priori the
possibility that her friend may be correct about the meaning of things
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as a whole. And Jonas’ “one single truth” doesn’t bar the possibility of
friendship because he understands that his conjectures aren’t proofs. 
Arendt’s appreciation of relativity in the interhuman realm runs the
risk of preemptively foreclosing important metaphysical and religious
options in the ongoing conversation. If Arendt is concerned about a cer-
tain blindness in Jonas’ conviction about the truth, Jonas is worried
about an emptiness at the heart of Arendt’s “thinking without banis-
ters.” But in their deepest moments, they recognize that they—and
philosophical friendship itself—need each other, like Lessing and Kant,
like Socrates and Plato.59
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